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Abstract—Botnets continue to be an active threat against
firms or companies and individuals worldwide. Previous research
regarding botnets has unveiled information on how the system
and their stakeholders operate, but an insight on the economic
structure that supports these stakeholders is lacking. The
objective of this research is to analyse the business model and
determine the revenue stream of a botnet owner. We also study
the botnet life-cycle and determine the costs associated with it
on the basis of four case studies. We conclude that building a
full scale cyber army from scratch is very expensive where as
acquiring a previously developed botnet requires a little cost. We
find that initial setup and monthly costs were minimal compared
to total revenue.
Index Terms—Business Model, Botnet, Malware, Revenue
Stream.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Botnets and malware over the last couple of years have
proven to be a serious threat to cybersecurity. A botnet is
a network of various computers which can be controlled by
attackers. The controller of the network is called the botmaster.
It gives commands to the network by making use of various
communication channels. The malicious software used to
control this network of computers is known as malware.
It comes as no surprise that the primary motive for the use
of botnets is for economic gain [1]. Although some revenue
estimates are known and knowledge regarding the involved
actors is available, the structure of the revenue stream is still
unclear. In this article we try to provide an insight on the
revenue flow, by making use of existing literature and four
different case studies.
The practitioners involved in the development botnet can be
divided in four tiers [2]:
Tier 1:Practitioners who rely on others to develop malicious
code, delivery mechanism and execution strategy.
Tier 2:Practitioners who have a great depth of experience,
with the ability to develop their own tools.
Tier 3:Practitioners who focus on the discovery and use of
unknown malicious code.
Tier 4:Practitioners who are organised, highly technical,
proficient and well funded to discover new
vulnerabilities and develop exploits.
On the basis of this tier distribution we develop a botnet
ecosystem as shown in Figure 1. In this article we analyse all
1This paper has been accepted for publication in the proceedings of
2018, 26th Euromicro International conference on Parallel, Distributed, and
Network-Based Processing (PDP).
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Fig. 1: Botnet Ecosystem
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Bulletproof Hosting Provider [1, 7] Perform Attacks [1, 2] Creating Fraudulent ad-clicks [1] Internet Relay Chat [9] Website/Server Administrators [7, 10]
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Dark Web Market Places [12] Cryptocurrency Mining [6]
Government Intelligence Agencies [6]
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Identity Protection Software Hacker Forums [8]
Network Connectivity Emails [7]
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Malware Development [1, 3] Stolen Bank Account Money [1]
Infections [1, 3, 11] Click Fraud [1]
Hosting [7] Sale of Booter Services [6, 7]
Bandwidth Sale of Spam Services [5]
Transaction Fees [7]
Customer Service [7]
Fig. 2: Business Model Canvas for a Botnet Owner
the linkages of this ecosystem by making use of frameworks
like business model canvas, product life cycle analysis and
cost benefit analysis.
II. BOTNET BUSINESS MODEL CANVAS AND LIFE CYCLE
In this paper we use the Osterwalder Business Model
Canvas [13] framework to depict the “business” of developing,
starting and using a botnet as shown in Figure 2.
Osterwalder & Pigneur [13] propose nine building blocks
as the basis of a business model, the logic of how a
company intends to generate profit. The nine building blocks,
customer segments, value propositions, channels, customer
relationships, revenue streams, key resources, key activities,
key partnerships and cost structure each have their own core
questions that can be used to characterise every business.
Rodriguez-Gomez et al. [14] proposes are six stages a
botnet goes through in its life-cycle: conception, recruitment,
interaction, marketing, attack execution and attack success.
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Article Activity Malware Context Finances
[5] Spam
advertised
pharmaceuticals
Unknown 360 Million emails
per hour 10,000 bots
$100 per sale, $3.5
mil. annually
[1] Robbing bank
credentials
Euro
grab-ber,
ZeuS based
30,000 Targets
across Europe
$47 mil. over 2.5
months
[7] Booter,
botnet-for-hire
Unknown 800,000 Attacks over
a 1 year period
$26k monthly
revenue, median of
24 months
[1] Advertisement
click fraud
Zero-Access 140,000 hosts $900k of daily ad
revenue losses
TABLE I: An overview of botnet case studies
Understanding the phases of the botnet life-cycle is essential
to estimate the costs involved.
1) The botnet life-cycle: The first phase, conception, is all
about motivation: why does one want to setup a botnet? On this
subject, Rodriguez-Gomez et al. [14] argues that there are five
motives for a botmaster to setup a botnet. These are money,
entertainment, ego, cause and social status. Of these five it is
argued that the primary motive is financial gain. This is usually
achieved by selling the source code of the botnet malware.
More common is renting out the botnet or its services. Booters
are an example of renting services based on botnets [15].
The second stage is the recruitment phase. Infecting
computers (or paying others to infect computers for you) with
botnet malware resulting in the botmaster being able to control
the computer. Usually, larger the botnet the better it is, as the
power of a botnet is highly dependent on its size. Depending
on the size, renting a botnet for DDoS attacks can cost up to
several thousands of dollars a day.
Next, the botmaster can decide to use the botnet himself
or rent the services based on botnet. It often takes place by
making use of underground online marketplaces or forums,
which can be found and accessed via the dark web. In the
U.S., the law that prohibits the user to create a botnet (amongst
other fraudulent computer activities) is known as the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act [16]. Other countries have similar laws
in regard to fraudulent computer use, which include botnet use
and ownership.
Bottazzi et al. [1] states that spamming and DDoS-attacks
can be considered least profitable among the activities
mentioned in Table I, since the operation is too noisy, this
stands in great contrast to the findings in Kanich et al. [5]
and the in Brunt et al. discussed vDos case. A summary of
previous findings on these cases can be found in Table I.
2) Actors in the life-cycle: Bottazzi et al. [1] has
defined a botnet assembly chain, which has six stages
regarding activities varying from development to utilization.
Furthermore, this assembly chain is coupled with the level of
skill necessary to be able to successfully complete the activity
mentioned in the brick, and the “darkness” of the market it
is operating in. The latter indicates the level of illegality in
the actions performed by the user. Gosler et al. [2] propose a
similar division, however more based on the involved actors,
which he calls tiers. It has already been discussed in Section
I.
Fig. 3: Botnet Assembly Chain [1]
The first stage of the botnet supply chain, R&D and
Money Transfers are arguably legal businesses. Research and
development involves the continuous search for exploits in
software, the development of new malicious software and
selling knowledge of computer systems and software. The
actors behind this process are mostly IT professionals and offer
support, customize the software to the wishes of the customer
and operate alone or in groups. The actors in this stage of
development can be linked to tiers two, three and four in the
hierarchy proposed by Gosler et al. [2].
The third and fourth stage, C&C (command and control)
Bulletproof Hosting and PPI (Pay Per Install) distribution
operate in a more grey area regarding legality. Bulletproof
Hosting includes offering web-based storage for the botnet
end-user to store stolen information like banking credentials
or passwords on. The hosting service can also serve as the
server for the command and control centre of the botnet
master. The control centre can consist of one or multiple
computers, in the last case typically for redundancy purposes
[17]. Regarding PPI Distribution; many malware developers
do not have the resources to spread the malware they have
written to various computers across the world. At least not on
a significant scale. To solve this problem they make use of the
so called PPI (pay-per-install) Distribution model. In essence
this involves the owner of the malware paying affiliates to
spread the malware, providing a commission to these malware
spreaders per infected device. The client making use of PPI
distribution to spread the malware usually collects the funds to
be able to afford this by selling regular botnet related services.
Taking a look at the tier-based hierarchy, it is likely that the
practitioners which are mentioned in tier 1 make use of the
PPI Distribution model. Caballero et al. [11] indicates the PPI
model is one of the most used ways of distributing malware.
Estimates are that, of the twenty most prevalent families of
malware, twelve made use of the PPI distribution model [18].
Lastly, stages five and six enter the indefinite illegal
spectrum. Actors involved in this stage are the owners of
Actors I.D.I. Connections U.S. NL U.K. EU(10 million connections)
Vulnerability analysts Y N 2.9 3 3.1 1.96
Exploit developers Y N 7.3 7.6 7.8 6.55
Bot collectors N Y 4.15 0.27 1.03 0.18
Bot maintainers Y Y 12.9 0.88 3.42 0.48
Operators Y Y 5.4 0.37 1.4 0.2
Remote personnel Y N 0.4 0.42 0.43 0.36
Developers Y N 2.85 3 3.04 2.56
Testers Y N 0.8 0.83 0.85 0.72
Technical Consultants Y N 2 2.1 2.14 1.79
System admins Y Y 0.5 0.03 0.13 0.019
Managers N/A N/A 6.2 3 3.8 2.4
TOTAL 45.5 21.5 27.1 17.4
All costs are in $ million.
TABLE II: Miller’s conceptual cyber army [3]
botnets, the ones who actually perform the attacks.
III. LIFE-CYCLE COST ANALYSIS
By identifying the various phases which occur in the
botnet’s life-cycle, it should now be possible to estimate the
costs involved in each step. In the following sections the
life-cycle has been split up in three phases. These steps,
acquiring malware, spreading and performing maintenance,
form the basis of building the botnet business.
A. Acquiring malware
For this calculation1, a study by Charlie Miller is taken
as the baseline [3]. According to his analysis a full scale
act of cybercrime aimed to break down great parts of digital
infrastructure of the U.S. will cost the attacker tens of millions
of dollars. This therefore indicates such an attack is only really
viable for large companies or government like institutions.
Furthermore, Miller estimates that planning the attack and
developing the malware takes at least a couple of years
before it is actually usable. To be able to apply the data he
collected into the perspective of other countries we propose
the following:
• Weigh in the active amount of internet connections of a
certain country - (defined as n) [19]
• Weigh in the ITU ICT Development Index (IDI), which
is (according to ITU) “used to monitor and compare
developments in information and communication
technology (ICT) between countries and over time”
(defined as i) [20]
• Set the active amount of internet connections and IDI
base level at the level of the United States.
This has resulted in the following equation:
n
nus
× i
ius
×Miller′s estimated costs (1)
In order to apply this formula correctly, it is important that
both the number of active internet connections and the IDI are
estimated in the same year. The costs estimated by Miller have
been released in 2010. Unfortunately, we have not been able
to find conclusive data regarding the IDI and the number of
1Miller estimates a total of 540 employees is necessary. One junior manager
per ten employees, one senior manager per ten managers. Annual wages are
set at $ 100k respectively $ 200k.
connections from this year. Therefore, In this study, we make
use of data collected in 2015.
The above calculations in case of the Netherlands result in
an estimate of annual costs of $3.11 million to be able to
launch a full scale attack on the internet infrastructure of the
Netherlands. This calculation is, however, a very rough and
an unreliable estimate. Fixed and managerial costs should be
different (in case of Netherlands) than the ones defined by
Miller. For example, spreading costs will most likely be a lot
less when compared to the U.S., simply because the amount
of devices is significantly lower. Therefore, we propose to
apply the calculation above only on certain aspects of malware
development. We show these calculations in the case of three
different countries in Table II.
Harris et al. [21] argues that for “the true do it yourself
type” there are botnet malware how to guides available for
less than $600. This seems logical: the mentioned ZeuS and
Mirai botnet packages are already set up, but still need some
configuration to get them running. The more expensive ZeuS
packages offer easier and more complete functionality.
B. Spreading the malware
In Miller’s case, if one would want to calculate the total
costs of malware, including spreading but excluding the use
and maintenance of the botnet, it should be possible to add
up $160k to the $16 million which is already accounted for.
In other cases, the average botmaster will most likely make
use of the earlier describe paid per install model. According to
Brian Krebs, making use of the PPI distribution model, costs
are estimated to vary from $7 to $180 per 1000 installations
[18]. As both researches have been conducted around the
year 2011, it should be possible to compare these costs.
Taking the average of $93.5 per 1000 installations ($0.0935
per installation), and comparing this to the estimated $160k
spreading costs for an average EU country, with the PPI
distribution model it would be possible to infect over 1.7
million devices. The spreading costs in Miller’s report appear
to be more economical, at around $0,016 per infected device.
C. Botnet maintenance
Botnet malware has to be maintained to ensure
effectiveness. In the case the owner of the botnet is
also the author of the malware code, he can resolve these
issues himself and release new revisions of his malware if
necessary. According to a Mirai based case study, maintenance
costs of desktop botnets exceeds the revenue generated by
DDoS attacks [4]. With the rise of IoT, a new target group
consisting of less secure devices like CCTV cameras has
risen. A botnet composed of these less secure devices may be
a lot cheaper to maintain even though it is ten times bigger.
The Mirai botnet makes use of these devices. Although the
malware can be cleared off an infected device by simply
rebooting it (as the malware is only stored on the device’s
RAM, which gets erased when rebooting) the same device
can most likely be re-infected almost immediately [22]. The
botmaster only has to keep a list of IP-addresses which have
been infected in the past, and scan if these IP-addresses are
still connected to the botnet.
Re-infection costs have been estimated at $0.0935 per
device. Furthermore, the malware creator has to constantly
innovate, as security updates are rolled out every day. Lastly,
in some cases the malware creator provides customer service
to his customers, which bought a malware package from
him. According to Miller, a level 1 malware developer earns
around $125k a year. Assuming the specific malware is being
developed and maintained by a level 1 developer, maintaining
the botnet costs the developer around $59 per hour. (Based
on 22 working days a month, working 8 hours a day). Let’s
apply these costs to the two botnet malware types:
ZeuS - As re-infection is impossible, the botmaster has to
rely on unpatched devices. If this is the case each infection
costs the estimated $0.0935. According to ZeuS tracker, the
average ZeuS binary antivirus detection rate lies around 40%.
Therefore, finding unpatched devices should not be a problem.
If the problem should arise new malware has to be developed,
or the ZeuS malware has to be altered, this would cost
the developer the estimated $59 per hour. Assuming the
developer has a normal tax-paying 8 hour a day job besides
malware developing, 8 hours of sleep a day and some spare
time, the developer can spend around 4 hours a day on
developing and/or maintenance. Over a year’s period, instead
of maintaining the botnet, the developer could have worked a
job which would have provided him around $62k. This will
be regarded as maintenance costs per year.
Mirai - As the owner of the infected device has very
little influence in making sure his/her device gets patched,
or requires at least some advanced computing knowledge to
do so, one can assume successful re-infection is more likely
to occur than not. Assuming the 2 year warranty period as
the minimum lifespan of the product, chances of the device
being replaced by a newer non vulnerable device (assuming
the device owner does not know his device has been infected)
seems negligible. This makes maintaining a Mirai botnet
much easier and cost efficient, as each re-infection (if done
by making use of the PPI model) only costs the estimated
$0.0935. This is, however, all speculation as conclusive data
regarding the maintenance of Internet of Things botnets is
currently unavailable.
Depending on the intended use of the botnet, it can now
be used or marketed to rent it out. In both cases the botnet is
being run from one or multiple command and control centres,
which are basically computers which run the software used to
control the botnet. Controlling the botnet costs time, of which
the costs per hour have been set at $59 in the previous section.
Marketing and selling the botnet costs little to no money.
Summarizing, the total setup costs for a ZeuS or Mirai based
botnet can be found in Table III. All numbers are on annual
basis, except of malware package and spreading costs.
IV. BOTNET ECONOMICS
The information given in Section III provides an adequate
basis to estimate money that flows to the various actors that
ZeuS Mirai Miller(10 million EU connections)
Malware package $700 up to <$10k <$30 N/A
Malware development $125k Unknown $16 million
Spreading per device $0.0935 $0.0935 $0.016
Maintenance $62k Unknown $48k
Marketing $28.8k $28.8k N/A
TABLE III: Estimated botnet setup costs.
DDoS - 30000 bots 2 Bank Fraud - 30000 bots Spamming - 10000 bots Click fraud - 140000 bots
N/A Unknown ZeuS Unknown ZeroAccess Malware type
Developer Mirai: $30 Zeus: $700 $700 up to < $10k3 Unknown $5k up to 10k Malware package
costs
Money
handler
$780 $564000 $9000 $750000 Transaction fees at
3%
(Bulletproof)
web hosting
provider
$2400 < $70 < $2400 <$70 Web and C&C
bulletproof hosting
costs
Distributor $2805 $2805 $935 $13090 Distribution costs by
the PPI model
Botmaster/user $26000 $18.8 million $300000 <$25 million Monthly revenue
Monthly
Profit
ZeuS: $19315 Mirai: $19985 >$18.2 million >$287665 <$24.2 million
TABLE IV: Aggregated botnet cost/benefits based on case
studies
occur in the life-cycle.
A. Cost-benefit analysis
While the analysis in Section III-C focuses on ZeuS and
Mirai, the analysis that follows is activity based. The four main
botnet related activities, DDoS attacks, spamming, bank fraud
and click fraud are linked to a specific type of malware. For
example, as explained before, Mirai is only suitable for DDoS
attacks [26]. A detailed overview of the researched cases can
be found in Table IV.
Since initial costs vary little between each case compared
to the potential profits, it is no wonder spreaders and hosting
providers take a significant part of DDoS revenue. Around
25% of total revenue per month to be precise, assuming every
bot has to be re-infected every month. A significant part,
especially when compared to the maximum of 1.1% of hosting
and spreading costs of the other three cases. Hosting could be
seen as a viable business, as it brings relatively low risk with
it. Spreading, however, brings great risks as it is demonstrable
punishable by law. The costs that have to be made to setup a
botnet are in most cases insignificant. It seems, however, the
real winners are the money handlers.
B. Economic impact on organisations
Information regarding the overall economic impact of botnet
attacks on various institutions is scarce. A possible cause for
this could be that it is hard to estimate the economic impact:
it is not always known which institutions are affected, and
economic impact is more often than not an indirect impact
[27, 28].
A 2011 report of intelligence provider Detica on the impact
of cybercrime on U.K. based institutions defines four types of
costs associated with cybercrime: costs in anticipation of, costs
as a consequence of, costs in response to and indirect costs
associated with cybercrime [29]. Regarding direct and indirect
impact, Anderson et al. elaborates on the aspects mentioned
above, and give a few examples, based on bank fraud [30].
Table V describes for each type of attack the subsequent costs
for the target company.
Cybercrime type Percentage of costs Annual costs (in million $) Attack costs (in $ ×1000)
Malware 16.50% 1.57 5.11
Phishing / SE 13% 1.24 95.8
Web-based attacks 16.70% 1.59 88.1
Malicious code 12.50% 1.19 92.3
Botnets 2.80% 0.27 0.995
Stolen devices 8.80% 0.84 31.9
DDoS 17.50% 1.66 133.5
Malicious insiders 12.20% 1.16 167.9
TABLE V: Financial impact of botnets on institutions
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present the botnet business model with the
help of the canvas proposed by Osterwalder and Pigneur[13].
We then discuss the stages and actors involved in a botnet
life cycle in Section II and analyse the life cycle costs of a
botnet in Section III. Finally, in Section IV we perform a cost
benefit analysis from the view point of an attacker on the basis
of four case studies and discuss the financial impact of botnets
on organisations. We draw the following conclusions from our
analysis:
• By making use of readily available malware packages and
outsourcing malware infection, it is possible to set up a
profitable botnet business within days.
• Initial investment costs on acquiring malware, spreading,
combined with recurring costs like hosting and
transaction fees, are nearly insignificant.
– In three out of four researched cases, set-up costs
accounted for a maximum of 1.1% of monthly
revenue.
• Profitability between various botnet uses varies
drastically. DDoS-for-hire (Booter) is the least profitable,
but also has the longest life time.
With the help of gathered knowledge regarding botnet
actors and revenue streams, future research should focus on
intercepting the revenue streams of botnets.
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